Denying Medical Staff Privileges Based on Economic Credentials by DiFranco, Sandra
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
2001
Denying Medical Staff Privileges Based on
Economic Credentials
Sandra DiFranco
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Denying Medical Staff Privileges Based on Economic Credentials, 15 J.L. & Health 247 (2000-2001)
 247 
DENYING MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES BASED ON 
ECONOMIC CREDENTIALS 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 247 
 II. DEFINING MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING IN OHIO .......... 249 
 A. Ohio Hospitals ............................................................. 249 
 B. Medical Staff Bylaws ................................................... 249 
 C. Medical Staff Membership ........................................... 250 
 D. Hospital Credentialing ................................................ 250 
 III. ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING ................................................ 252 
 A. Defined......................................................................... 252 
 B. Prospective Payment System ....................................... 253 
 C. Hospital Bylaws ........................................................... 254 
 IV. MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING AND THE LAW................. 255 
 A. Discretion By The Courts ............................................ 255 
 B. Due Process ................................................................. 257 
 C. Antitrust ....................................................................... 257 
1. A Contract, Combination, or  
 Conspiracy............................................................ 258 
2. A Substantial Impact on Interstate  
Commerce ............................................................ 260 
3. An Anticompetitive Purpose  
 or Effect ................................................................ 260 
4. An Effect on Relevant Services  
 and Markets .......................................................... 261 
 D. Essential Facility Doctrine .......................................... 262 
 E. Closed Staff Policy....................................................... 265 
 F. Exclusive Contracts ..................................................... 266 
 V. CURRENT LAW REGARDING ECONOMIC  
  CREDENTIALING .................................................................. 268 
 VI. PROPOSAL:  CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP  
  BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A PHYSICIAN  
  FROM BEING AMBIGUOUS TO A MORE  
  STRUCTURED EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP .......... 269 
 VII. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 270 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A hospital should be able to deny a competitor physician medical staff privileges.  
The hospital administration, governing body, and peer review committee are 
qualified to determine whether a physician should be denied medical staff privileges.  
These three entities are able to consider the qualifications of the physician, the need 
for additional medical staff at the facility, and whether another staff member is in the 
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hospital’s best “business” interest.  The hospital administration oversees the 
performance of the executive duties of a hospital.1  A governing body is the term that 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization [hereinafter 
“JCAHO”] uses to describe who exerts the ultimate control and represents ownership 
of the facility.2  The peer review committee consists of physicians on the medical 
staff; it is an evaluation of a physician’s performance by other physicians, usually 
within the same geographic region and medical specialty.3 
Under Ohio Revised Code § 4731, a physician who is licensed may lawfully 
practice medicine, thus, the professional license is a legal prerequisite to practice 
medicine.4  Physicians are unable to build a successful practice without the ability to 
exercise hospital staff privileges.5  Likewise, physicians are extremely important to a 
hospital because without its medical staff, a hospital would not be able to care for its 
patients.6  A physician without hospital staff privileges would find it difficult to 
compete with those physicians who have been granted privileges and can offer 
patients a wide variety of services. 
Although a physician needs staff privileges in order to provide his services to 
patients, a hospital cannot permit all physicians access to hospital facilities.  The 
hospital has a duty to review the credentials of all the physicians who desire staff 
privileges and to allow privileges only to those deemed competent.7   
Health care costs are continuing to rise.  This forces hospitals to consider the cost 
and efficiency of each physician when making privileging decisions.  However, 
hospitals cannot deny a competitor physician staff privileges strictly based on 
economic factors.8  If this is the only consideration that the hospital utilizes, a denial 
or restriction of privileges based solely on competitive considerations may expose 
the hospital to liability under federal antitrust as well as state tort claims.9   
This Note will focus primarily on Ohio laws and statutes.  A comparison with 
other jurisdictions also will be analyzed.  This Note will illustrate the complexities 
and ambiguities that exist regarding how a physician and hospital are associated with 
each other.  This Note attempts to accomplish the following:  (1) discuss what 
medical staff credentialing entails, (2) discuss what constitutes economic 
                                                                
1BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (6th ed. 1990). 
2Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, Health Care Terms, at 
<http://www.credentialinfo.com/cred/glossary.cfm> (stating the JCAHO’s term for the board 
of directors, board of trustees, or the body that exterts ultimate control and represents 
ownership of the facility).  
3Id. (stating peer review is the evaluation of a physician’s performance by other 
physicians, usually within the same geographic and medical specialty). 
4OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.341 (West 1998) (pertaining to doctors of medicine; 
§ 4731.43 pertains to doctors of osteopathy). 
5MARCIA J. POLLARD & GRACE J. WIGAL, HOSPITAL STAFF PRIVILEGES WHAT EVERY 
HEALTH CARE PRACTITIONER AND LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW 118 (1996). 
6SUSAN O. SCHEUTZOW, OHIO HEALTH CARE PROVIDER LAW 73 (1994). 
7POLLARD, supra note 5, at 118. 
8Id. 
9Id. at 2. 
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credentialing, (3) analyze the current law regarding medical staff credentialing, (4) 
analyze the current law regarding economic credentialing, and (5) propose a solution 
to the current system regarding the vague “relationship” that exists between a 
physician and a hospital.  This solution would encourage hospitals to manage their 
affairs similar to a business operation.  There would be an employer/employee 
relationship between a hospital and all physicians with medical staff privileges.  This 
Note will explain why a hospital should be able to deny a competitor physician 
medical staff privileges. 
II.  DEFINING MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING IN OHIO 
A.  Ohio Hospitals 
In order for a hospital to operate in Ohio, it must either be accredited by the 
JCAHO, the American Osteopathic Association [hereinafter “AOA”], or certified by 
Medicare.10  The JCAHO and AOA each require a hospital, that seeks accreditation, 
to have a single organized medical staff.11  A hospital seeking certification from 
Medicare, a federal payment program, must also have an organized medical staff.12  
The JCAHO and AOA have detailed requirements as to what needs to be included in 
the medical staff bylaws.13  
The Ohio Revised Code provides that each hospital must have a mechanism for 
determining who may obtain medical staff privileges.14  This is the only statutory 
provision that Ohio has regarding who is eligible for medical staff privileges.  
Therefore, each hospital individually determines the mechanisms that it will employ 
regarding medical staff privileges.  The statute requires the governing body of every 
hospital to set standards and procedures in considering applications for staff 
membership and staff privileges.15  For example, the governing body of a hospital 
must consider the applicant’s respective state licensure in considering a physician for 
its staff.16 
B.  Medical Staff Bylaws 
Medical staff bylaws are legal documents that hospitals use as a means of 
governance for the facility.17  Although the medical staff drafts policies and 
procedures, the governing body assumes legal responsibility for the hospital and thus 
is ultimately responsible for approving bylaws, policies, and procedures.18  The 
                                                                
10SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 73-74. 
11Id. at 73 n.4. 
1242 C.F.R. § 482.22 (1999). 
13Id. 
14OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(A)-(B) (West 1999). 
15Id. 
16Id. 
17Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2. 
18Id. 
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bylaws create a framework within which the medical staff can act with a degree of 
freedom in order to accomplish their tasks.19 
A description of the medical staff’s organization is found in the hospital bylaws.  
Each hospital has its own set of bylaws that the medical staff must follow.  The 
JCAHO provides in part that the hospital bylaws must define the method of selecting 
officers for medical staff membership; the qualifications and responsibilities of 
officers; the conditions and mechanisms for removing officers from their positions; 
the requirements for frequency of meetings and for attendance; and a mechanism to 
provide for effective communication among the medical staff, hospital 
administration, and governing body.20 
C.  Medical Staff Membership  
The medical staff is a group of physicians and other health care professionals 
permitted by state law and a hospital to function as a group and manage different 
aspects of the hospital’s business.21  The medical staff is one of the three components 
of hospital governance, along with the governing body, and the hospital 
administration.  One responsibility of the medical staff under the hospital bylaws is 
to review applications for medical staff membership and privileges.22  The medical 
staff then makes its recommendations regarding the applicants to the governing body 
that makes the final determinations.23 
The medical staff is self-governing and is responsible for the for the quality of 
the professional services provided by individuals with clinical privileges.24  
Physicians at the hospital who have obtained medical staff privileges must adhere to 
the medical bylaws, rules and regulations, and policies that are implemented as part 
of the medical staff’s performance-improvement activities.25  
D.  Hospital Credentialing 
The medical staff is largely responsible for the credentialing process.  Physician 
credentialing is the process of gathering relevant data regarding a physician’s 
qualifications for membership to a particular medical staff.26  This data will serve as 
                                                                
19JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., 1996 ACCREDITATION 
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS, VOL. 1, STANDARDS (photo reprint 2000) [hereinafter “JOINT 
COMM’N”]. 
20Id. 
21Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2 (defining medical staff-the 
semi-autonomous group of physicians, other licensed independent practitioners, and other 
such health care professionals permitted by state law and a hospital to take responsibility as a 
group for specified aspects of hospital operation). 
22SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 73-74. 
23Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.  
24See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 24. 
25Id. 
26American College of Emergency Physicians, Physician Credentialing and Delineation of 
Clinical Privileges in Emergency Medicine, available at <http://www.acep.org/2,6350.html>. 
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a factor in determining whether a physician is granted or denied staff privileges.27  
The specific data that is evaluated is at the discretion of the institution.  Credentialing 
is usually a two-pronged process, which involves establishing requirements and 
evaluating individual qualifications for entry into medical staff membership.28  First, 
credentialing involves considering and establishing the professional training, 
experience, and other requirements for medical staff membership.29  Second, 
credentialing involves obtaining and evaluating evidence of the qualifications of 
individual applicants.30 
A hospital has specific mechanisms which it utilizes when deciding whether to 
deny or grant a physician medical staff privileges.  Based on medical staff 
recommendations and the hospital bylaws, the governing body has the final decision 
in staff privilege decisions.31  If a physician has been denied staff privileges and feels 
that the decision was made in a discriminatory manner or was an adverse decision he 
is entitled to a fair hearing and an appeal process.32  Decisions to deny a physician 
medical staff privileges must consider criteria that is directly related to the quality of 
patient care.33 
A physician who desires membership at a hospital fills out an application for the 
medical staff; the physician is then given a written copy of the hospital bylaws, rules 
and regulations, and policies.34  The applicant then signs an agreement, if granted 
medical staff privileges, the physician will be bound to the bylaws, rules and 
regulations, and policies.35  In the hospital bylaws, there is a section that indicates the 
criteria that the medical staff and hospital board will evaluate.36  The hospital then 
verifies this information from the primary sources.37 
The credentialing process includes information regarding a suspended or pending 
suspension of the applicant’s license.38  It also inquires as to whether the applicant 
was denied or had  privileges revoked at another organization.39  Applicants consent 
                                                                
27Id. 
28Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.  
29Id. (stating that credentialing involves considering and establishing the professional 
training, experience, and other requirements for medical staff membership).  
30Id. (stating that credentialing involves obtaining and evaluating evidence of the 
qualifications of individual applicants). 
31OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(B) (1999). 
32See infra Section IV.B. 
33POLLARD, supra note 5, at 9. 




38Id. at 30.  
39See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 31. 
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to the hospital verifying any of the information that they have disclosed.40  The 
credentialing is made for a period of not more than two years.41 
The applicant applies for privileges for which he has documented experience in 
performing.42  Clinical privileging determines the minimum training and experience 
necessary for a clinician to competently carry out a particular procedure.43  It also 
entails whether the credentials of the applicant meet the requirements of the hospital 
and its bylaws.44  Finally, privileging allows authorization to carry out the procedures 
that a physician has requested.45  According to JCAHO’s 1998 Comprehensive 
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, each hospital should have professional criteria 
as the basis for granting initial or reviewed/revised clinical privileges.46  These 
criteria must pertain to, at the very least, evidence of current license, relevant 
training and/or experience, current competency, and health status.47 
III.  ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING 
A.  Defined 
Economic credentialing is a term used when a hospital makes a decision 
regarding an individual for medical staff membership based upon the impact that a 
physician has economically on the hospital.48  The term is aimed at making a 
physician aware of how he is using the hospital’s resources.49  For example, assume 
that Dr. X has one hundred patients for whom his diagnostic tests and treatment costs 
are $2000.  Assume Dr. Y also has one hundred patients and that Dr. Y’s prescribed 
diagnostic tests and treatment costs are $3000.  Dr. X has a cost ratio of twenty to 
one.  Dr. Y has a cost ratio of thirty to one.  In certain managed-care plans such as 
Health Maintenance Organizations [hereinafter “HMOs”] with prepaid premiums, 
                                                                
40Id.  
41Id. 
42Id. at 33.  
43Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, supra note 2.  
44Id.  
45Id. (stating that privileging is the three-pronged process of determining which diagnostic 
and treatment procedures a hospital is equipped and staffed to support, the minimum training 
and experience necessary for a clinician to competently carry out each procedure, and whether 
the credentials of applicants meet requirements and allow authorization to carry out requested 
procedures). 
46Healthcare Credentialing Information Supersite, Approach Our Credentialing, at 
<http://www.credentialinfo.com/cred/fundamentals/credapproach.cfm> (stating, that 
according to the JCAHO’s 1998 Comprehensive Accreditation Manual for Hospitals, each 
hospital should have professional criteria as the basis for granting initial or renewed/revised 
clinical privileges; these criteria pertain to, at the very least, evidence of current licensure, 
relevant training and/or experience, current competency, and health status). 
47Id. 
48POLLARD, supra note 5, at 117. 
49Id. 
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Dr. X has preferable “economic credentials” as compared with Dr. Y.  In order for 
the managed care company to make a profit, it would be prudent to have Dr. X on 
staff as opposed to Dr. Y.50  This data is kept and used to grant membership to 
physicians in hospitals, HMOs, or Independent Practice Associations [hereinafter 
“IPAs”].51 
When a hospital’s economic considerations are related to the quality of patient 
care or physician competency, they are not viewed as “pure” economic 
considerations.52  For example, a physician’s economic credentials can be compared 
with other physicians’ economic credentials within the same hospital and other 
physicians caring for patients within the same specialty.  Quality of care is 
implicated when the physician’s patients’ length of stay in the hospital for a 
particular diagnosis is compared to the hospital average.53  Quality of care is also 
implicated where the hospital compares the individual physician’s charges with the 
hospital average in the same Diagnosis-Related Group [hereinafter “DRG”], and 
analyzes the physician’s hospital utilization rate.54  Some hospitals have begun to use 
such economic criteria in reviewing physician activity and making their privilege 
decisions,55and courts have upheld such criteria as valid.56 
B.  Prospective Payment System 
In today’s increasingly competitive medical market, hospitals may legitimately 
choose to limit the number of physicians with staff privileges for economic reasons.57  
Legitimate reasons include administrative and quality control costs, as well as the 
need to establish and maintain the hospitals reputation as a quality provider.58  
Hospitals generally operate under a system of prospective reimbursement from 
payors such as Medicare and Medicaid, therefore, a physician’s ability to control 
costs is critical.  One commentator has stated that between seventy to ninety percent 
                                                                
50Robert Weinmann, Medical Red-lining: Economic Credentials For Physicians, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Jan. 12, 1996, at A19. 
51Id. 
52POLLARD, supra note 5, at 8. 
53Id. 
54Id. at 105. 
55Anita J. Slomski, Hospitals Wield a Heavy Club Against High-Cost Doctors, MED. 
ECON., Oct. 7, 1991, at 57. 
56See, e.g., Maltz v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 503 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1986) (holding that 
the hospital is entitled to deny applications for privileges based on hospital bed limitation and 
adequate staffing in physician’s are of specialization); Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 
568 N.E.2d 1181 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that utilization of the hospital can be 
considered in making privilege decisions). 
57Deborah Casey, Austin v. McNamara and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act:  
From Speculation to Implementation, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 389 (1990) (discussing of the 
importance of hospital reputation in the marketplace).  
58Id. 
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of health care expenditures are within the control of physicians.59  Because of this, 
hospitals are forced to consider a physician’s economic impact on the hospital. 
Under a prospective payment system, a hospital is paid a fixed amount per 
patient based on the patient’s diagnosis, regardless of actual treatment costs.60  The 
system is based on DRGs, which are used to establish a schedule of fixed treatment 
costs.61  Thus, the DRG schedule limits the amount that the hospital may bill 
Medicare for each diagnosed patient illness. 
The DRG reimbursement system is “prospective” because the cost of treatment is 
determined before, rather than after treatment.62  This reimbursement scheme creates 
a “risk-based incentive for hospitals to economize.”63  Thus, the only way a hospital 
can substantially increase its operating revenue is to monitor the amount of tests and 
treatment costs that physicians incur. 
Under the prospective payment system a physician may “cost” the hospital a 
substantial amount of money.  For example, consider a patient admitted to the 
hospital with a diagnosis of a myocardial infarction.  The hospital has agreed to 
accept a certain amount of money for the diagnosis.  If the average length of stay 
without any complications for this diagnosis is three days and the patient remains in 
the hospital for one week the hospital will be unable to generate revenue.  The same 
is true of the physician who orders excessive amounts of tests while the patient is 
hospitalized.  Therefore, a hospital can successfully increase its operating revenue by 
examining a physician’s economic credentials. 
C.  Hospital Bylaws 
If a hospital decides to examine economic criteria in determining whether to 
grant or deny a physician staff privileges, it must state in its bylaws how the 
economic criteria will be examined or utilized.64  For example, attorney Jack 
Schroder, Jr. advises hospitals to include a bylaw that notifies physicians that they 
must: 
[w]ork cooperatively with the quality assurance committee, the utilization 
review committee, the executive committee and administration to meet 
and practice within the guidelines established by the hospital, its medical 
                                                                
59Katherine Beseech, Hot Topics in Medical Staff Credentialing:  Economic Credentialing 
and HIV-Affected Practitioners, 42 HEALTH 128 (1993). 
60The federal government adopted a prospective payment system for Medicare hospital 
patients in 1983.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 ww(d) (1988).   
61Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:  Legal Barriers to Health Care 
Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 436 (1988).  The system is based on DRGs, which 
are used to establish a schedule of fixed treatment costs.  Id.  The DRG schedule caps the costs 
that hospitals may bill Medicare for each diagnosed patient illness.  Id.  The DRG 
reimbursement system is “prospective” because the cost of treatment is determined before, 
rather than after treatment.  Id.  Obviously, this reimbursement scheme creates a “risk-based 
incentive for hospitals to economize.”  Id. 
62Hall, supra note 61, at 436. 
63Id. 
64Jack Schroder, Jr., Critical Revisions in Medical Staff Bylaws, American Bar Assoc. 
Forum on Health Law Presentation (Spring 1994). 
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staff or the local Professional Review Organization, to minimize or 
eliminate disallowed admissions, to eliminate technical diagnosis entry 
and coding errors, to order or utilize supporting ancillary services only 
when necessary, and to shorten length of stay at the hospital where 
medically appropriate.65 
Schroder states that this criteria should be included in the hospital bylaws 
because the bylaws use objective language.66  The objective language of the bylaws 
assures that all physicians are reviewed objectively by the hospital.67  Furthermore, 
because the criteria examined under the bylaws address quality of care concerns as 
well as economic issues, the bylaw requirement cannot be viewed as a “pure” 
economic consideration.68 
IV.  MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING AND THE LAW  
A.  Discretion by the Courts 
The courts have consistently stated that the main purpose of a hospital is to serve 
the public.69  Courts have confirmed that a hospital, in making staff decisions, must 
consider the needs of the patients.70  Hospital powers must be exercised reasonably 
for the public good and must genuinely serve public health objectives.71  The hospital 
board is given broad discretionary powers in managing their affairs, including the 
selection of medical staff.72 
Each state, along with the federal regulations, has statutes regarding hospital staff 
and professional privileges.  The Code of Federal Regulations states in part that a 
“hospital must have an organized medical staff that operates under bylaws approved 
by the governing body and is responsible for the quality of medical care provided to 
patients by the hospital.”73  Under Ohio Revised Code § 3701.351, hospitals “shall 
set standards and procedures to be applied to the hospital and its medical staff in 
considering and acting upon applications for staff membership or professional 
                                                                
65Id. 
66Id. 
67CAROLINE R. WILSON & ANNE M. DELLINGER, STAFF MEMBERSHIP AND CLINICAL 
PRIVILEGES IN HEALTH CARE FACILITIES LAW: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS, HMOS, AND 
EXTENDED CARE FACILITIES 18 (1991) (stating that hospital administrators who amend the 
bylaws to include economic criteria as a valid factor for denying or terminating staff privileges 
should consider that the JCAHO standards support a hospital’s right to enforce its interest in 
efficiency by requiring physicians to abide by hospital bylaws, policies, and regulations; the 
states of Indiana and Colorado have enacted statutes that recognize the hospital’s interest in 
efficient operation). 
68POLLARD, supra note 5, at 104. 
69Belmar v. Cipolla, 475 A.2d 533 (N.J. 1984). 
70Desai v. Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662, 666 (N.J. 1986). 
71Id. at 668. 
72Sokol v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 173 F.3d 1026, 1032 (6th Cir. 1999). 
7342 C.F.R. § 428.22. 
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privileges.”74   Courts do not interfere with a reasonable management decision 
concerning staff privileges as long as that decision strengthens the health care 
mission of the hospital.75 
A hospital may deny a physician medical staff privileges, but must not violate 
Ohio Revised Code § 3701.351.76  Under this Statute, hospitals are prohibited from 
adopting standards for staff membership or clinical privileges that are not reasonably 
related to accepted measures of skill, education, and competence.77  Ohio Revised 
Code § 3701.351(B) prevents a hospital from discriminating against qualified 
persons who are certified to practice medicine, osteopathic medicine, podiatry, 
dentistry, or psychology.78  In Dooley v. Barbarton Citizens’ Hospital, the plaintiff 
prevailed when the hospital discriminated against him for being a podiatrist.79  The 
court held that the qualifications placed on a podiatrist for staff privileges were not 
reasonably related to a determination of whether or not a podiatrist was qualified.80  
Thus, the court held that the hospital violated § 3701.351.81 
In granting a physician staff privileges, the hospital must consider the need for 
and impact of additional doctors on the existing hospital’s staff.82  Hospitals must 
balance the interests of its management with those of a doctor who desires to practice 
at a particular hospital.83  Hospital officials are properly vested with large measures 
of managing discretion, and to the extent that they exert their efforts towards the 
maintaining of hospital standards and higher medical care, they will receive broad 
judicial support.84 
In Sosa v. Board of Managers, the physician alleged the hospital violated his 
constitutional rights by denying him medical staff privileges.85  The Fifth Circuit 
held that although the physician satisfactorily met all of the requirements for staff 
privileges on paper, it was not unconstitutional for the hospital to deny him staff 
privileges.86  The court also noted that the hospital board may choose to exact 
additional standards reasonably related to the operation of the hospital.87 
                                                                
74OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(A) (West 1999). 
75Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1963). 
76OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351 (West 1999). 
77Dooley v. Barberton Citizens’ Hosp., 465 N.E.2d 58 (Ohio 1984). 
78OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.351(B) (West 1999). 
79465 N.E.2d at 61. 
80Id. at 63. 
81Id. at 58. 
82Belmar, 475 A.2d at 538. 
83Id. at 539.  
84Id. at 538. 
85Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of the Val Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 
1971). 
86Id. at 176. 
87Id. 
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A refusal must be based on “any reasonable basis, such as professional or ethical 
qualifications of the physicians or the common good of the public and the 
Hospital….”88  The hospital must be given great latitude in prescribing the necessary 
qualifications for potential applicants.89  A hospital board is given broad discretion in 
screening applicants, but it must only refuse applicants for those matters which are 
reasonably related to the operation of the hospital.90  Consequently, a hospital may 
deny a qualified applicant staff privileges and not fear legal proceedings. 
B.  Due Process 
The JCAHO can require a hospital to include certain provisions in its bylaws.91  
When a physician is denied medical staff privileges, the bylaws state that 
mechanisms exist, including a fair hearing and appeal process if the physician feels 
he has been adversely denied.92  The Supreme Court of Ohio held that medical staff 
members must exhaust all administrative remedies provided in the hospital bylaws, 
policies, and rules or regulations prior to bringing an action to the court.93  Generally, 
courts accept these proceedings and do not substitute their judgments for that of the 
hospital’s judgment regarding the denial of a physician’s staff privileges.94 
C.  Antitrust 
When a hospital denies a physician staff privileges, it may face an antitrust 
challenge, because a hospital’s acts are subject to scrutiny under Sections One and 
Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act.95  If the hospital violates the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, it faces civil damages, injunctions, and a possibility of criminal action.96 
Antitrust statutes were enacted to protect unfair competition.97  Section One of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or foreign nations…” and declares such contracts to be illegal.98  The four 
elements that must be satisfied in order for an antitrust violation to arise are: (1) a 
contract, combination, or a conspiracy; (2) a substantial impact on interstate 
                                                                
88Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1968). 
89Id. 
90Sosa, 437 F.2d at 176-77. 
91SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 64.  
92JOINT COMM’N, supra note 19, at 36. 
93Nemazee v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 564 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1990). 
94Khan v. Suburban Cmty. Hosp., 340 N.E.2d 398 (Ohio 1976); Klinge v. Lutheran 
Charities Ass’n, 383 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Duffield v. Memorial Hosp. Ass’n., 361 
F. Supp. 398 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Dillard v. Rowland, 520 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); 
Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 232 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967). 
9515 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1999). 
96§§ 1, 2, 4, 15(a), 26. 
97See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (Pocket ed. 1996). 
9815 U.S.C. § 1 (1999). 
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commerce; (3) an anticompetitive purpose or effect; and (4) an effect on relevant 
services and markets.99 
1.  A Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy 
In satisfying element number one, courts need to determine if a contract was 
formed between the parties.100  Whether a contract exists between a hospital and its 
physicians pertaining to the staff bylaws remains uncertain.  Some states, such as 
Alabama and Indiana, hold that hospital bylaws constitute a legally binding contract 
because if the bylaws do not legally bind the physician and hospital, in essence, they 
are meaningless.101 
In Ohio, the general rule that courts tend to follow is that the bylaws do not form 
a per se contract.  In Munoz v. Flowers, the court stated that each set of bylaws 
should be examined to determine if the parties intended to form a contract. 102  In this 
case, the court held that the hospital never intended to be bound by its bylaws 
because the preamble stated that the bylaws were “subject to the ultimate authority of 
the applicable governing bodies.”103 
Courts have not ruled definitively on whether a contract is formed between a 
physician and hospital regarding the bylaws. Hospitals can argue that the bylaws are 
not a legally binding entity.  There is no consideration between the hospital and the 
physician therefore, no contract exists.104  Consideration is a basic, necessary element 
for the existence of a valid contract that is legally binding on the parties.105  It 
consists of some right or inducement by one party while the other party suffers a 
detriment or loss.106  Courts are reluctant to find consideration between a physician 
and a hospital regarding the bylaws. 107 
Case law has held that a conspiracy does not usually exist between a hospital and 
the medical staff.  The hospital’s governing body, hospital administration, and the 
medical staff (in the form of a peer review)108 convene to determine acceptance or 
denial of medical staff privileges.109 
                                                                
99See e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that the 
phrase “restraint of trade” in the Sherman Act refers not to a particular list of agreements, but 
to a particular economic consequence that may be produced by quite different sorts of 
agreements in varying times and circumstances). 
10015 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1999). 
101Clemons v. Fairview Med. Ctr. Inc., 449 So. 2d 788 (Ala. 1984); Terre Haute Reg’l 
Hosp. Inc. v. El-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
102Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 364-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). 
103Id. at 365. 
104Natale v. Sisters of Mercy of Council Bluffs, 52 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1952). 
105BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 308 (6th ed. 1990). 
106Id.  
107Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n, 182 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y. 1963). 
108Swatch v. Treat, 671 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that peer review 
is a process intended to encourage the rigorous and candid evaluation of a physician’s 
professional performance by his peers); Josephine M. Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the 
Medical Peer Review Process, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 419, 423 (1993) (noting that 
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A peer review committee can be attacked as not being an objective system to 
evaluate physicians.  It may be argued that one must always consider the possibility 
of a conspiracy against a competing physician regarding obtaining medical staff 
privileges.  The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Copperweld  
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., holding that an intracorporate agreement cannot 
constitute a conspiracy.110  Because a peer review decision is usually based on the 
medical staff’s recommendation, and the decision is ultimately made by the 
hospital’s governing body, intracorporate immunity would likely apply.111  In other 
words, a hospital staff cannot be held liable for a conspiracy with the governing body 
within the meaning of Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act.112 
A conspiracy was not found in Todorov v. DCH Healthcare, where a physician 
was denied additional staff privileges at a hospital.113  The facts of the case did not 
exclude the possibility that the hospital acted unilaterally and procompetitively.114  
The court stated that the hospital may act to foster competition and to serve its own 
economic interest without constituting a conspiracy.115 
In Willman v. Heartland Hospital East, the Court goes as far as stating that even 
if a hospital can conspire with its medical staff—although it does not concede this 
point—revocation or denial of medical staff privileges does not violate antitrust 
laws.116  Even if a court finds that a conspiracy has been found, a hospital can defend 
itself by showing that it acted for an independent reason.  Promoting quality medical 
                                                          
the physicians on the committee become peer evaluators for the hospital while remaining an 
individual provider of health care services for the hospital, maintaining direct and indirect 
competition with those individuals he will review); Jacqueline Oliverio, Hospital Liability for 
Defamation of Character During the Peer Review Process:  Sticks and Stones May Break My 
Bones, But Words May Cost Me, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 739 (1990) (asserting that the peer review 
process is based on the theory of self-regulation in that hospital physicians are asked to review 
and evaluate the performance of their co-workers and to restrict or deny hospital privileges if 
necessary). 
109Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996). A conspiracy was not 
found in this Fifth Circuit case between a hospital and hospital administrator because the 
parties stood in an agency relationship.  Id. 
110Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Cooper v. 
Forsyth County Hosp. Auth. Inc., 479 U.S. 972 (1986) (recognizing that making a peer review 
recommendation does not prove the existence of a conspiracy); Oksanen v. Page Mem’l 
Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 1991) (commenting that where a peer review procedure is 
used, a conspiracy is hard to prove if the review committee has no power to make the final 
decision). 
111See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 776 (holding that (1) officers or employees of the 
same firm do not provide the same plurality of actors imperative of Section One of the 
Sherman Act conspiracy, and (2) a corporation does not violate Section One of the Sherman 
Act by agreeing to pursue a course of action with a wholly-owned subsidiary).   
112Id. 
113Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456-57 (11th Cir. 1991). 
114Id. at 1456. 
115Id. at 1457. 
116Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 514 U.S. 1018 (1995). 
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care is a defense that hospitals can use in order to justify the reason a physician was 
denied staff privileges.117 
2.  A Substantial Impact on Interstate Commerce 
A physician must try to show that a substantial impact on interstate commerce 
has occurred in order to satisfy the second element of the Sherman Act.118  Before 
1991, physicians had a difficult time bringing cases into federal court because they 
could not show the nexus between being denied medical staff privileges and 
interstate commerce.119  Federal courts often dismissed the action because physicians 
were unable to show that the conspiracy which excluded them significantly impacted 
interstate commerce.  In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, the Court rejected the 
hospital’s claim that by denying a physician staff privileges there was no impact on 
interstate commerce.120  This made it easier for physicians to meet the second 
element, which shows a substantial impact on interstate commerce and thus bring 
claims into the federal court system. 
3.  An Anticompetitive Purpose or Effect 
Next, a physician needs to establish the anticompetitive purpose or effect of the 
hospital’s conduct.121  In other words, to prove injury actionable under the antitrust 
laws, the physician must show an injury to competition, not just to themselves as 
competitors.122 
A successful antitrust plaintiff must prove both injury to himself and to 
competition in the market.123  The Court in Summit Health stated that the purpose of 
a federal antitrust law is “[t]he essence of any § 1 violation is the illegal agreement 
itself, [so] the proper analysis focuses upon the potential harm that would ensue if 
the conspiracy were successful, not upon actual consequences.”124  A physician who 
is excluded from the market is measured not by a particularized evaluation of the 
physician’s practice but by a general evaluation of the restraint’s impact on other 
physicians practicing in the area and particular specialty.125 
The United States Supreme Court has held that no anticompetitive purpose was 
found where a physician was denied staff privileges.126  Although the hospital 
utilized exclusive contracts with its anesthesiologists, this was legal and did not 
foster an anticompetitive purpose among other anesthesiologists.127  In Jefferson 
                                                                
117Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 640 (3d Cir. 1996). 
118Id. 
119POLLARD, supra note 5, at 105. 
120500 U.S. 322 (1991). 
121Id. 
122Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982). 
123Boczar v. Manatee Hosp. & Health Sys. Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (M.D. Fl. 1990). 
124500 U.S. at 322. 
125Id. at 323. 
126Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
127Id. at 8.  
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Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Supreme Court stated if the exclusive 
contract foreclosed so much of the market as to reasonably restrain competition, the 
contract would then be unlawful.128  The Court discussed whether it was necessary to 
determine if the exclusive contract had an adverse effect on competition among 
anesthesiologists.129  The Court denied this claim and reasoned that the exclusive 
contract simply shifted the focus of competition among anesthesiologists.130 
4.  An Effect on Relevant Services and Markets 
In order to satisfy the final element, a physician who was denied staff privileges 
from a competitor hospital must claim that the denial of staff privileges limits his 
ability to serve patients in the relevant market.131 
Establishing a relevant market entails analyzing the geographic areas from which 
hospitals draw their patients.132  This approach relies on patient inflow and 
outmigration statistics.133  The patient inflow statistic measures the percentage of 
patients from outside a particular area who come to the hospital within the area.134  
The patient outmigration statistic measures the percentage of patients from a 
particular area that uses hospital services outside the area.135  If both the inflow and 
the outmigration statistics are low, the particular geographic area is probably the 
relevant market.136 
In Robinson v. Magovun,137 a thoracic surgeon was denied staff privileges at 
Allegheny General Hospital. The Court held that the physician’s denial of staff 
privileges was lawful because it was based on the hospital’s plan for quality control 
and fair competition.138  Dr. Robinson was a board-certified thoracic surgeon who 
was seeking hospital privileges.139  In Pittsburgh there were six hospitals which 
provided open heart surgery services.140  After being denied privileges, Dr. Robinson 
brought an antitrust violation against the hospital alleging violations of Sections One 
and Two of the Sherman Act.141  The hospital reasoned that the denial of Dr. 
                                                                
128Id. 
129Id. at 3. 
130Id. at 31. 
13115 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1999). 
132Roger D. Blair & James M. Fesmire, Antitrust Treatment of Hospital Mergers, 2 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 49 (1988-89). 
133Id.  
134See id. at 45-50. 
135Id. at 52.  
136Id. 
137688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982).   
138Id. at 846. 
139Id. at 827 
140Id. at 828. 
141Id. at 859. 
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Robinson’s staff privileges was made after it had determined that its addition to its 
medical staff would be inconsistent with the hospital’s institutional objectives.142 
In conclusion, if a physician can prove all of the above four elements then the 
hospital may be liable for civil, as well as criminal penalties, when a hospital denies 
a physician staff privileges.  A physician could show that his denial of staff 
privileges had an effect on interstate commerce.  A physician can often easily prove 
that his denial had an effect on the relative market.  Recent case law affirms all of 
these points.143  Difficulty arises when the physician tries to prove a contract or a 
conspiracy.  If this element can be shown the physician then has to prove the hospital 
had an anticompetitive purpose for denying staff privileges.  A hospital’s defense to 
denying a physician staff privileges is that it was promoting quality medical care.144  
Courts give broad discretion to a hospital board in managing their affairs, including 
the selection of medical staff.145 
D.  Essential Facility Doctrine 
The essential facility doctrine is a relatively new theory that utilizes both the law 
of monopolization and the refusal to deal.146  The theory began to be utilized in the 
1980’s when plaintiffs began invoking the doctrine as a supplement theory of 
antitrust law in two situations, monopolization and refusal to deal.147 
First, the law of monopolization involves a competitor who desires to gain access 
or use some “essential” facility.148  The claim is that competitor can not compete 
effectively or enter into the marketplace without access to the essential facility.149 
Second, a refusal to deal involves a group of firms which produce or control a 
facility to which a competitor desires access.150  The claim is that a group has refused 
                                                                
142See Robinson, 688 F.2d at 826 (arguing that his exclusion from the medical staff 
restrained trade by restricting his ability to practice medicine).  Plaintiff also claimed that the 
hospital had an unlawful purpose or an unreasonable anticompetitive effect, thus violating 
Section One of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 828.  The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Dr. Robinson failed to establish 
that the hospital and certain surgeons on the hospital’s staff unreasonably restrained trade.  Id.  
When evaluating Dr. Robinson’s application for staff privileges, the hospital noted his ability 
to provide continuous care to patients, his ability to contribute to the cardiothoracic residency 
program, and to work in harmony with fellow surgeons.  Id. at 829.  The Court ruled that these 
criteria were reasonably related to the hospital’s legitimate institutional objectives.  Id. 
143See supra Section IV. C. 
144Mathews, 87 F.3d at 644. 
145Sokol, 173 F.3d at 1026. 
146Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:  An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST 841 (1990). 
147Scott D. Makar, The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry, 21 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 915 (1994). 
148MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
149Makar, supra note 147, at 915. 
150Century Air Freight, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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to deal with the competitor and has thereby unreasonably denied him the “essential” 
resource.151 
The essential facility doctrine requires the owner of the facility or governing 
body to provide its business rivals with the use or access to the facility on fair 
terms.152  The term has been successfully used in discussing railroads, electric 
utilities, and natural gas industries.153  Recently, physicians have attempted to apply 
the term to instances where medical staff privileges have been denied. 
Physicians have endeavored to use the theory in cases involving a physician 
attempting to gain access to a competitor hospital; the physician in this case claims 
that he cannot compete effectively in his profession without receiving admitting 
privileges from the facility.154  Physicians often claim that the hospital is 
“monopolizing” the market.155  It is argued that the competitor hospital is willingly 
attempting to monopolize its services in a particular geographical area.156 
A unilateral refusal by a hospital against a physician usually is legal.157  The 
current law generally allows facilities the freedom to deal or to refuse to deal with 
whomever they choose, unless the refusal supports an illegal restraint or constitutes 
illegal monopolization.158  Even if a facility is deemed to be a monopolist, it has no 
general duty to cooperate with competitors.159 
In order for a physician to be successful in his claim, it must be shown that a 
hospital is an “essential” facility.160  Health care facilities are not “essential” in an 
antitrust sense.161  Although arguably, health care services are “essential” to an 
individual’s well-being.162  Courts usually reject claims that hospitals are “essential” 
                                                                
151Makar, supra note 147, at 915. 
152Id. at 913. 
153William B. Tye, Competitive Access:  A Comparative Industry Approach to the 
Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L. J. 337 (1987). 
154Makar, supra note 147, at 915. 
15515 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (stating that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize” shall be 
guilty of a felony). 
156Makar, supra note 147, at 915 (stating monopoly is not illegal under the antitrust laws; 
it is only illegal if the hospital uses illegitimate business practices to achieve or maintain 
monopoly power); United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (holding monopoly power 
alone is not sufficient to establish a monopolization claim; there must also be anticompetitive 
conduct evidencing a general intent to monopolize-willful maintenance or acquisition). 
157Makar, supra note 147, at 916. 
158Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 52 ANTITRUST 344 (1978). 
159Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-01 (1985). 
160MCI Communications Corp., 708 F.2d at 1081.  
161Makar, supra note 147, at 927. 
162Id. 
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facilities.163  Because physicians have a difficult time proving this element, claims 
against a hospital as violating the essential facility doctrine are likely to fail.164 
Little coherent judicial guidance exists as to what “essential” means.165  Courts 
have yet to define the terms “essential facility” or a “monopolized facility.”166  A few 
courts have stated that to be essential “it is sufficient if duplication of the facility 
would be economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap 
on potential market entrants.”167  Some courts have determined what essential is: a 
facility is not essential merely because it is better than or preferable to another.168  
Facilities that competitors can “practicably” or “reasonably” duplicate are not 
essential.169  The lack of objectiveness provides courts with discretion in their 
interpretation and application of the term “essential facility.” 
Physicians may try to claim that staff privileges are essential facilities.  The claim 
is that the physician is unable to compete without privileges that permit access to the 
facility.  A number of courts have rejected this claim and have held that the staff 
privilege relationship between a physician and a hospital is unique and not subject to 
significant antitrust scrutiny.170  In Pontius v. Children’s Hospital,171 the plaintiff-
physician alleged that the hospital conspired in violation of the antitrust laws not to 
retain him on the hospital’s staff. The physician asserted a per se essential facility 
claim.172  The court held that the essential facility doctrine is inapplicable to hospital 
staff privileges decisions.173  The court’s decision appears to be based entirely on its 
                                                                
163See Advanced Health-Care Servs. Inc., v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 
1990); Key Enters. v. Venice Hosp., 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993). 
164Makar, supra note 147, at 927 (stating that courts are reluctant to grant antitrust claims 
to physicians where there is evidence that although the physician was denied staff privileges 
from one hospital a substantial income was made by the physician from another facility; courts 
reason that the facility is not essential if economic rivals continue to prosper even though staff 
privileges were denied). 
165Id. at 922. 
166Id. 
167See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986); Hecht v. Pro-
Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
168See, e.g., Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539. 
169See, e.g., Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992. 
170See Tarabishi v. Northern Mich. Hosp. Inc., 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing cases 
that have declared the essential facility doctrine inapplicable to staff privilege cases for public 
policy reasons); Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 995-96 (N.D. Ga. 
1992) (stating access to hospital is necessary for practice of obstetrics but “inappropriate” to 
apply the essential facility doctrine that would prevent hospital from keeping unqualified 
doctors off its staff). 
171552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982). 
172Id. at 1354.  
173Id. at 1370 (“Even if we accept, without any evidence having been put forward, the 
proposition that [the hospital’s] thoracic and cardiovascular surgical facilities may not 
practically be duplicated, we believe that it would be singularly inappropriate to apply a 
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concern that mandatory access under a per se essential facility test could prevent a 
hospital from denying medical staff privileges to an unqualified applicant.174 
In Castelli v. Meadville Medical Center,175 the court concluded that the essential 
facility doctrine does not apply to “exclusive service contracts by hospitals.”  The 
court stated that “if there were a case in which the hospital would be an essential 
facility, [the defendant] would not be that hospital.176  Within a forty mile radius of 
[the defendant-hospital], there are eight other hospitals at which Castelli could 
potentially practice.”177  The court ultimately concluded that the presence of a 
significant number of competing facilities negated the essential facility claim 
presented.178 
As shown in this section, physicians are generally unsuccessful in alleged 
violations of the essential facility doctrine.  Courts continue to follow the trend that 
the hospital is given broad discretion in making decisions regarding staff privileges. 
E.  Closed Staff Policy  
A hospital may restrict admission to the medical staff on a limited basis.  An 
example is a hospital regulating staff privileges to only physicians practicing a 
certain specialty; this is often referred to as a “closed staff policy.”179  If additional 
physicians on staff would cause over-utilization of the hospital’s limited resources, 
this would justify refusing a qualified physician to hospital staff.180  Under Ohio law, 
hospitals are given broad discretion in determining who will obtain medical staff 
privileges.181 
A New Jersey court held that closing the medical staff was legal; however, 
instances where exceptions were made to permit physicians to join the staff if they 
were joining the practices of other physicians on staff, was not legal and was found 
to be discriminatory.182  It is permissible to have a closed staff as long as it is done in 
a nondiscriminatory and reasonable manner.183 
Hospitals instituting a closed staff policy can do so without fearing legal 
proceedings.  Case law defends the practice where the exclusion of the physicians 
                                                          
doctrine which would prevent a hospital from keeping doctors it had adjudged unqualified off 
of its staff.  Neither the public policy nor the Sherman Act can countenance such a result.”). 
174Makar, supra note 147, at 939. 
175702 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1988); see also infra Section IV. F. 
176Id. at 1205.  
177Id. at 1209. 
178Id. at 1211.  
179SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 83. 
180Desai, 510 A.2d at 669. 
181Sosa, 437 F.2d at 177. 
182Desai, 510 A.2d at 672. 
183Id. 
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was done as not to affect the quality of patient care and where the decision furthers 
the health care mission of the hospital.184 
F.  Exclusive Contracts 
In Ohio, exclusive contracts for services of provider-based physicians are a valid 
and enforceable means of providing medical services in a hospital.185  An exclusive 
contract is more prevalent regarding hospital contracts with provider-based physician 
groups, such as radiologists, pathologists, anesthesiologists, and emergency room 
physicians whereby the physician group is given the exclusive control to provide 
medical services in that specialty.186 
Courts have held that exclusive contracts did not violate public policy and were a 
reasonable choice by the hospital.187  The primary purpose of a hospital is to serve 
the public, regardless of the arrangement between physician and hospital.188  Courts 
do not normally interfere with a reasonable management decision concerning staff 
privileges as long as that decision furthers the health care mission of the hospital.189 
In 1984, the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision Jefferson Parish 
Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.190  In July 1977, Dr. Hyde, the defendant, applied for 
anesthesia privileges at the hospital.191  The medical staff recommended that Dr. 
Hyde be granted privileges to the hospital.192  Despite the recommendation, the 
hospital governing board denied the application because of the exclusive contract the 
hospital had with Roux & Associates.193 
The Court held that the exclusive contract between the anesthesiology group and 
the hospital was valid and enforceable.194  The Court noted, that like any contract, 
this contract would have been unlawful if it foreclosed so much of the market as to 
unreasonably restrain competition.195 
                                                                
184Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 323 A.2d 495 (N.J. 1974); Falcone v. 
Middlesex County Med. Soc’y., 170 A.2d 791 (N.J. 1961); Desai, 510 A.2d at 672. 
185SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 103-04. 
186Id. 
187Belmar, 475 A.2d at 539-40. 
188Id. at 538. 
189Greisman, 192 A.2d at 825. 
190466 U.S. at 2.  The hospital exclusively contracted with the Roux & Associates, a group 
of anesthesiologists.  Id.  The group agreed to provide twenty-four hour staffing, not to work 
elsewhere, to supervise the nurse anesthetists, and to perform all needed anesthesia services 
for the hospital.  Id.  In return for Roux & Associates’ services, a five-year contract as the 
exclusive provider of anesthesia services at Jefferson Parish Hospital was established.  Id. 
191Id. at 3.  
192Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 3.  
193Id. at 5. 
194Id. at 3. 
195Id. at 31. 
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Exclusive contracts dealing with provider-based physician groups are 
permissible.196  Their specialty areas differ from surgeons, general practitioners, or 
other physicians who admit to hospitals.  Provider-based physician groups generally 
do not admit patients to hospitals, and are not responsible for overseeing the patient’s 
care while hospitalized.197  Provider-based physicians usually rely on consultations 
from other physicians for business.198  When a physician’s business relies primarily 
on consults problems often ensue.  Physicians who admit patients to hospitals may 
exert unreasonable demands on the provider-based physicians.199 
For example, without exclusive contracts in an open system, a provider-based 
physician, like an anesthesiologist, may be called in by a surgeon on his day off.200  
The anesthesiologist at home, knowing he needs consults from surgeons, may come 
into the hospital even though there was adequate anesthesia coverage at the time in 
the hospital.201  The anesthesiologist may fear not receiving consults from a 
particular surgeon if he does not meet the surgeons expectations.202   
The surgeon may favor one anesthesiologist over the others and may stop 
consulting him if he does not come in on his day off, rearrange his schedule to meet 
the needs of the surgeon, or care for the surgeon’s patients in the manner that the 
surgeon prefers.203  This would negatively affect the anesthesiologist’s practice.  
Also, competition from surgeons in an open system can breed dissension among 
anesthesiologists, even if they are partners.204  If one anesthesiologist is receiving 
considerably more consults than the others this may provoke a hostile working 
environment for the physicians. 
Closed staff policies have been consistently upheld by the courts.  Hospitals can 
institute closed staff policies, especially with provider-based physicians, and deny 
physicians medical staff privileges because of them. 
                                                                
196Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 438, 439 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that decision to enter an 
exclusive contract for anesthesia services by a public hospital had a rational basis and 
therefore did not discriminate); Centeno v. Roseville Cmty. Hosp., 107 Cal. App. 3d 62 (1979) 
(stating that governing body’s policy decision to enter an exclusive contract for radiology 
services does not arbitrarily or unreasonably exclude otherwise qualified radiologists from 
staff membership); Lewin v. Saint Joseph Hosp. of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 368 (1978) 
(holding that decision of governing authority to operate chronic renal dialysis facility under 
exclusive arrangement with a single group of nephrologists was substantially rational). 
197Belmar, 475 A.2d at 539. 
198Provider-based physicians do not have admitting privileges.  They rely on physicians 
who do have admitting privileges for business.  Physicians request the services of the 
anesthesiologist in the form of a consult.  Provider-based physicians provide the service 
requested by the physician but do not oversee the care of the patient.   
199Belmar, 475 A.2d at 539. 
200Id. 
201Id. 
202Id. at 541.  
203Id. 
204Belmar, 475 A.2d at 540. 
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V.  CURRENT LAW REGARDING ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING 
Denying a competitor physician medical staff privileges is warranted under 
economic credentialing as long as the decision is made in furtherance of quality of 
care.205  Federal and state law prohibits hospitals from making a privilege decision 
based solely on economic factors.206  For example, a medical staff member may 
desire to negatively affect a competitor’s private medical practice negatively through 
the denial of hospital access.  The greater number of physicians in a geographic 
market with access to one or more hospitals, the more the physicians will need to 
compete with each other for patients.  The resulting competition might motivate 
physicians on a hospital medical staff to deny privileges to competitors in an attempt 
to reduce the number of doctors in the market.207  This would violate federal antitrust 
laws designed to protect the public from anticompetitive and monopolistic 
behavior.208 
Another form of economic credentialing is prohibiting physicians from serving 
on the staff if they have strong ties or loyalties to competitor hospitals.209  In Florida, 
a doctor was denied membership to a hospital staff because he already was a 
cardiovascular surgery director at another facility.210  In other words, his services 
were declined, not because he was not qualified to practice cardiovascular surgery at 
another facility but because he was viewed as an economic competitor.211   
Sherry S. Bahrambeygui, a plaintiff’s attorney, says it is possible to look at 
economic factors when evaluating physicians: “Economic credentialing [can be 
done] if it’s a fair process where the quality of care being provided is also considered 
in the mix,” she said.212  “But if you have an organization that is looking only to the 
economics, and not also considering other factors that could be influencing practices 
that bear on quality of care, then I do think there is a great deal of exposure there.”213 
In Los Angeles, a physician was denied privileges solely on a business and 
financial analysis; the physician was told “the decision is in no way a reflection of 
your performance.”214  In Ohio, a court held that a hospital could consider criteria 
unrelated to patient care if the criteria was rationally related to the operations of the 
                                                                
205POLLARD, supra note 5, at 9. 
206Id. at 8. 
207Richard Griffith & Jordan Parker, With Malice Toward None:  The Metamorphosis of 
Statutory and Common Law Protections for Physicians and Hospitals in Negligent 
Credentialing Litigation, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 157 (1991). 
208POLLARD, supra note 5, at 8. 
209SCHEUTZOW, supra note 6, at 82. 
210Robert Weinman, Medical Red-lining: Economic Credentials for Physicians, S.F. 




214Lewisburg Cmty. Hosp. Inc. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1991). 
2000-01] DENYING MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES 269 
hospital and that the criteria be found in the hospital bylaws.215 Case law has shown 
that courts have upheld decisions by a hospital to deny a physician staff privileges 
where economic criteria was a factor. 
VI.  PROPOSAL:  CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A HOSPITAL AND A 
PHYSICIAN FROM BEING AMBIGUOUS TO A MORE STRUCTURED 
EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
As this Note has shown, a hospital can legally deny a competitor physician staff 
privileges.  A hospital’s reasoning must include furtherance of quality of patient care 
in order to escape legal proceedings.216  A solution to this difficult situation is for the 
hospital to maintain an employer/employee relationship with all of the physicians on 
the medical staff. 
Employment entails a written or oral contract for hire.217  The hospital-employer 
would have a contract with the physician-employee.  This would clarify the 
uncertainty of whether a contract exists between a hospital and a physician.  Under 
this contract, the physician would continue to render services at the hospital as an 
employee of the facility. 
The key determination regarding an employer/employee relationship is the fact 
that the employer can influence or control the behavior of the employee.218  The 
hospital could assert its power over the physician by requiring the employee to meet 
the standard of care of a reasonable physician in his particular specialty. 
As an employer, the hospital would hire a physician when necessary to benefit 
the public.  A decision to hire the physician would also be considered from the 
business aspect of the hospital.  The governing body, hospital administration, and 
medical staff in the form of a peer review committee, would act as a system of 
checks and balances.  Each would comport itself in accordance with the others.  
None could make an independent decision regarding the denial of a physician’s 
medical staff privileges without the other two.  Therefore, the fear of one of the three 
branches becoming too powerful is alleviated.  Issues such as economic 
credentialing, a closed staff policy, antitrust, and exclusive contracts would then not 
be litigated as frequently when a physician is not hired by the hospital.  In this 
manner, a hospital would be less prone to be a defendant in a suit by a physician who 
was denied medical staff privileges. 
The physician and hospital would enter into a contract that would include terms 
such as salary, the duration of the contract, and the degree of skill that would be 
required by the employee in order to be employed by the hospital.  The contract 
would be a legally binding entity for both employer and employee.  If one party were 
to breach the contract then this would be the appropriate time for the courts to 
intervene.   
A hospital is a business similar to any business such as a Fortune Five Hundred 
Company, a franchise, or a family owned business.  Companies maintain 
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employer/employee relationships and are able to become successful businesses.  
There are no other businesses that engage in the unique relationship that currently 
exists between a physician and a hospital.  There is usually no exchange of money 
that occurs between a physician and hospital,219 although the importance of each 
party is apparent.  Hospitals could not exist without physicians and physicians could 
not adequately care for patients without the use of hospitals.  The JCAHO has 
defined the governing body to be the one that exerts the ultimate control and 
represents ownership of the hospital.220  Today, successful business owners engage in 
employer/employee relationships to manage their businesses.  Hospitals should do 
the same. 
As this Note has shown, ambiguities exist between a hospital and a physician 
regarding the authority of a hospital to deny a physician medical staff privileges.  By 
instituting an employer/employee relationship between a physician and a hospital 
such ambiguities would decrease.  By decreasing the ambiguities the number of 
judicial proceedings would decrease. If legal proceeding were decreased public 
policy will be served.  Therefore, the concept of an employer/employee relationship  
should be utilized between a physician and a hospital. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
A hospital has a right and a duty to review the qualifications of physicians, but 
also to consider the need for and impact of additional physicians for its hospital 
staff.221  The needs of the hospital must be balanced with the needs of the physician 
who desires to practice at the facility.  Hospitals must make decisions that are based 
on the benefit of the public and must take into consideration the basis for their 
existence, which is to serve the public.222  
Hospitals are able to deny physicians staff privileges based on different factors.  
Economic credentialing is a fair process that hospitals use when evaluating a 
physician’s credentials.  The hospital can use this tool along with others to deny a 
physician staff privileges.  It is very difficult for a physician to be successful 
regarding an antitrust claim.  Hospitals can deny a physician staff privileges without 
a substantial fear of engaging in an antitrust violation.  Closed staff policies and 
exclusive contracts have been consistently upheld by the courts. 
In conclusion, this Note has illustrated the complexities and ambiguities that exist 
regarding how a physician and hospital are associated with each other.  One 
alternative that can be applied is to change the association between the two entities to 
a concrete employer/employee relationship.  By doing so, hospitals can make 
decisions regarding denying a physician medical staff privileges without 
apprehension.  Serving the public and managing the business would take precedence 
to court proceedings. 
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